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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-POWERS OF AGENCIES-RIGHT OF REGISTRANT TO 
WITHDRAW REGISTRATION STATEMENT FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION-Petitioner filed a registration statement with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for an issue of corporate stock. 
Shares of the same class as those being registered were widely held by 
members of the public. Petitioner repeatedly amended the statement,1 
so that it had not yet become effective nearly three months after the 
initial filing. At this time, petitioner sought to withdraw its registration 
statement. The commission denied the application for withdrawal, and 
after a hearing, issued a stop order, preventing the statement from be-
coming effective and indicating its unreliability.2 On petition for review 
117 C.F.R. §230.473 (1949; Supp. 1959). 
2 48 Stat. 79 (1933), 15 U .S.C. (1958) §77h (d). Both a stop order and withdrawal 
prior to the effective date prevent the registration statement from becoming effective and 
make further sales and distribution activities through the instruments of interstate com-
merce or the mails unlawful. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §77e. However, there 
are significant differences between the effects of a stop order and a withdrawal. See note 
5 infra. 
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of the order, held, affirmed. Where members of the public hold shares 
of the same class of security covered by a registration statement filed 
with the SEC, the commission may deny permission to withdraw the 
statement before the effective date and issue a stop order prohibiting 
further sales activities by use of the mails or in interstate commerce. 
Columbia General Investment Corporation v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, (5th Cir. 1959) 265 F. (2d) 559. 
In 1936, the United States Supreme Court, in Jones v. Securities and 
Exchange Commission,3 held that a registrant had an absolute right, un-
fettered by administrative discretion, to retract a registration statement 
prior to its effective date, at least where no securities of the class seeking 
to be registered were publicly outstanding.4 This decision gave the regis-
trant an absolute right to terminate the commission's jurisdiction to inves-
tigate in order to determine whether the registrant willfully had filed a 
false or incomplete statement, making him amenable to prosecution.5 
The lower federal courts early limited Jones to cases where withdrawal was 
sought prior to the effective date.6 The court in the principal case dis-
tinguished Jones on the ground that in that case shares of the same class 
as those being registered were not publicly outstanding at the time the 
registration statement was filed.7 Although the Jones case may have been 
properly distinguished to avoid the application of its rule, in the light of 
congressional action subsequent to that decision the general soundness 
of the distinction, and thus, the continued vitality of Jones, must be ques-
tioned. The Securities Act of 1933 originally prohibited the offering for 
sale of securities filed for registration until the statement's effective date.8 
In 1954, Congress amended the act so as to permit registrants to make 
offers for sale and to solicit offers to buy9 during the period after filing 
3 298 U.S. 1 (1936). 
4 Prior to the Jones decision, the commission had discretion, under rule 960, now 
17 C.F.R. §230.477 (1949; Supp. 1959), to refuse withdrawal of a registration statement, 
either before or after its effective date, in any case where it had reason to suspect that the 
filed statement included a material misstatement or omission. Under such rule there must 
be a finding by the commission that the withdrawal is "consistent with the public interest 
and the protection of investors." 
5 See Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 at 23 (1936). Although withdrawal terminates the 
commission's jurisdiction to investigate further concerning the registration statement, 
issuance of a stop order would have no such effect. In addition, under rule 252 (c) of 
the S.E.C.'s Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §230.252 (c) (1949; Supp. 1959), adopted subsequent 
to Jones, the issuance of a stop order bars the registrant's use of the $300,000 general 
exemption from registration requirements for five years. A registrant armed with an 
absolute right of withdrawal, however, obviously could avoid the impact of this rule. 
6 Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. SEC, (10th Cir. 1939) 100 F. (2d) 888; Resources Cor-
poration International v. SEC, (D.C. Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 929; SEC v. Hoover, (N.D. III. 
1938) 25 F. Supp. 484. See, generally, Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 202 (1951). See also 
84 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 1019 (1936). 
7 Principal case at 562. 
s 48 Stat. 77 (1933). 
9 In practice, the general sales promotion, just short of actual sales, may be extensive. 
See, generally, CHoKA, AN INTRODUCTION TO SECURITIES REGULATION 17 (1958). 
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but before the registration becomes effective.to ·Thus, the 1954 amend-
ments in conjunction with an absolute right of withdrawal would allow 
a registrant a minimum of nineteen days (allowing one day for with-
drawal) to capitalize upon the phantasm of legality afforded him by filing 
the registration statement. Delaying amendments, by which he may post-
pone the statement's effective date, license additional time for exploitation. 
Under these circumstances, it seems clear that, regardless of whether or 
not. shares of the same class are held by members of the public at the time 
of filing, the possible mischief resulting from an absolute right of with-
drawal is equally violative of the purpose of the Securities Act of 1933.11 
In the former case, a profiteering registrant might buy some of the out-
standing shares, file a statement and distribute a fraudulently favorable 
prospectus, and then sell his shares at a price reflecting investor optimism 
generated by the false representations. To avoid an investigation which 
might uncover his fraud, the registrant need only withdraw his statement. 
Similarily, even if there were no shares outstanding, a registrant might 
excite potential investor interest by a fraudulently optimistic prospectus, 
then withdraw and consummate the sales without utilization of interstate 
commerce or the mails, thus avoiding the reach of the federal act. Hence, 
the distinction made in the principal case to avoid application of the 
Jones rule, although proper for that purpose, appears to be generally 
unsound. In either case, an unscrupulous registrant might file and capi-
talize upon a false or incomplete prospectus with apparent immunity 
from prosecution, where an absolute right of withdrawal exists. In a 
recent case,12 the Securities and Exchange Commission has faced the prob-
lem directly, rather than searching for questionable distinctions,18 and 
found the effects of the 1954 amendments14 sufficient to prevent absolute 
withdrawal on facts substantially the same as Jones. The position taken 
by the commission is certainly worthy of support in the courts. 
] ohn Edward Porter 
10 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §77e(a), (c). 
11 The design of the act and of the provision requiring registration is to protect 
the investing public against imposition and fraud in the sale of securities by requiring the 
full and fair disclosure of information concerning the character of the security before its 
sale in interstate commerce or through the mails. See Creswell-Keith, ~c. v. Willingham, 
(D.C. Ark. 1958) 160 F. Supp. 735; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); SEC v. Ralston 
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). 
12 In the Matter of Comico Corp., Securities Act (1933) Release No. 4050 (1959), 
decided just three weeks after the principal case. 
18 Although the existence of an option to purchase some of registrant's shares might 
have raised the question of whether a public interest was involved, the commission 
determined the issue of absolute right of withdrawal without regard to the option. 
14 In regard to the 1954 amendments, the commission stated: " ..• we think the change 
in the effect of the filing of a registration statement which was made by the 1954 amend-
ment to Section 5 of the Act creates a public interest upon filing which precludes an abso-
lute right of withdrawal. ... " See note, 45 VA. L. REV. 1061 (1959). 
